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DID THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESTROY THE 
PROSPECTS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE WHEN 
LAWYERS STORE CLIENTS’ FILES IN THE CLOUD – AND WHAT, 
IF ANYTHING, CAN LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 
REALISTICALLY DO IN RESPONSE? 
Sarah Jane Hughes∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the months since Edward Snowden’s revelations about the National 
Security Agency’s (“NSA”) comprehensive gathering of metadata from 
telephone calls, emails and uses of the Internet here and abroad, many 
commentators have focused on whether and to what extent the data collection 
programs have exceeded the NSA’s authority.1  Additionally, commentators have 
asked how the data may have enabled the NSA’s recognition of many 
relationships previously considered confidential by the parties to the underlying 
communications. 
                                                                                                                                   
 ∗ Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law, Maurer 
School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Hughes is the co-author of RESPONDING 
TO NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (ABA, 2009) (with Professor David P. 
Fidler), the curator and primary editor of RFIDS, NEAR-FIELD COMMUNICATIONS AND MOBILE 
PAYMENTS:  A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS (ABA, 2013), and co-author with Roland T. Trope of the article 
entitled Red Skies in the Morning – Professional Ethics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 111 (2011), hard copies of which are available from the author.  She also has 
published articles on privacy and data security, electronic and mobile payments, banking law, 
virtual currencies, and policies and regulations related to the deterrence of money laundering.  She 
is a graduate of Mount Holyoke College and of the University of Washington’s School of Law.  
She can be reached at sjhughes@indiana.edu. 
Professor Hughes wishes to thank Professor Jon Garon for his kind invitation to participate in 
this Law + Informatics Symposium on Cyber Defense Strategies and Responsibilities for Business 
and Industry.  She also acknowledges the valuable research for this paper provided to her by Janelle 
R. Duyck, Maurer School Class of 2015, particularly the compilation of formal and informal 
opinions issued by state bar associations or states’ highest courts on cloud-computing and 
professional ethics since August 4, 2011 that appears as Appendix I to this paper. 
This paper would not be possible without the path-breaking presentations in 2009 and 2010 by 
Roland L. Trope and Claudia Ray, members of the New York Bar, relating to professional ethics 
and use of social media and cloud computing entitled The Real Realities of Cloud Computing:  
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 1. Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year, Audit Finds, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-
privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-
49ddc7417125_story.html. 
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Less attention had been paid to other collateral consequences of the NSA’s 
data-gathering work and the threats it poses to the confidential and privileged 
information that communications between lawyers and clients often contain.  
Focus shifted to certain collateral consequences with two relatively recent 
revelations in particular:  the revelations that (1) the NSA may have introduced 
some tools to allow it to decrypt encrypted data,2 and (2) that it apparently 
enjoyed the fruits of signals intelligence by its Australian counterpart, the 
Australian Signals Directorate, relating to the representation by a U.S. law firm 
and its client the government of Indonesia pertaining to a then-pending trade 
dispute between the U.S. and Indonesia, and shared those fruits with client 
agencies in the federal government.3  Both reports raise fresh concerns over 
privileged communications and clients’ confidential data moving through 
electronic communications into storage, including cloud computing storage. 
In our 2011 article entitled Red Skies in the Morning – Professional Ethics at 
the Dawn of Cloud Computing [hereinafter “Red Skies”],4 Roland L. Trope and I 
observed, among other things, that lawyers and law firms using the cloud for 
storage of clients’ files and documents would enable easier access to files and 
documents by governments.5  We asserted that lawyers, law firms, and clients 
would not know about the access or manner of access until the access had been 
obtained.6  (Like most Americans, at that time, we were unaware of the scope of 
the NSA’s surveillance programs relating to domestic telecom communications 
and Internet storage.)  Our prediction was based on the then-known authority for 
the government to gain access,7 the ongoing disputes about the protections that 
the Electronic Privacy Communications Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) gave to telecom 
records,8 and the fact that both the Foreign Intelligence Supervision Act 
(“FISA”)9 and other “national security letters” authority prohibited the disclosure 
                                                                                                                                   
 2. See generally Glenn Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted 
Messages, THE GUARDIAN (July 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/ 
microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data. 
 3. See Jason Risen and Laura Poitras, Spying by N.S.A. Ally Entangled U.S. Law Firm, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2014, at A1  [hereinafter Risen & Poitras]. 
 4. Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning – Professional Ethics at 
the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 230-235 (2011). 
 5. Id. at 230-233. 
 6. Id.  
 7. E.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Title II (Stored Communications 
Act), 18 U.S.C. §§2701 -2722, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978, 50 U.S. C. ch. 36, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783.  For a comprehensive discussion of 
national security letter laws, see David P. Fidler & Sarah Jane Hughes, RESPONDING TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY LETTERS:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (2009). 
 8. See Somini Segupta, Updating an Email Law From the Last Century, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/technology/updating-an-e-mail-law-
from-the-last-century.html?pagewanted=all. 
 9. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S. C. ch. 36, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783. 
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of their receipt by the person or firm holding the information sought.10  Only in 
recent months has the Department of Justice made it clear that they obtained 
information used in criminal proceedings via one of the “national security” 
avenues of access they have.11 
Our 2011 article also anticipated the enhanced risks that governments and 
others could gain access to cloud-stored files when the cloud provider stores 
documents in undisclosed offshore locations,12 and we cited the ABA’s Formal 
Op. 08-451, which noted that new issues could arise with the non-U.S. laws on 
seizures in judicial or administrative proceedings notwithstanding claims of 
client confidentiality.13 
This paper updates that 2011 article in modest ways related to its forecast of 
more and easier government surveillance of work product and client documents 
in cloud storage.  From the base of the 2011 article, it also looks at the more 
recent past with its revelations of NSA surveillance and towards a future in 
which lawyers and law firms may have to employ less technologically hip 
techniques for communicating with clients while maintaining traditional lawyer-
client privileges and storing clients’ trade secrets and other confidential records. 
Part II of this article explains the most current rules on lawyers’ obligations 
to protect the confidential and privileged information they obtain from clients 
using as its benchmarks the August 2012 amendment to Rules 1.1, 14 1.4,15 1.6,16 
(including its new subsection (c)), and 1.15,17 and new comments to those 
sections of the America Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“MRPC”) based on the ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20.18  It also 
compares the 2012 amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that 
relate to the NSA data-collection programs to the prior MRPC versions of these 
                                                                                                                                   
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d)(2) (2011); see also Matt Apuzzo & Nicole 
Perlroth, U.S. Relaxes Some Data Disclosure Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2014, at B1-2 (providing 
that earlier in 2014, the Obama administration agreed to allow Internet companies such as Google, 
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Facebook to disclose how often the government asks for their customers’ 
information, but will not permit the companies to reveal what the government collects or how much 
data it collects. Apuzzo and Perlroth also cite Forrester Research predictions that concerns over 
data accessed by national security letters and FISA court orders “could cost the so-called cloud 
computing industry as much as $180 billion – a quarter of its revenues – by 2016”). 
 11. See NSA Surveillance:  A New Door to Court Challenges? NEWSMAX WORLD (Feb. 27, 
2014),  http://www.newsmaxworld.com/GlobalTalk/US-NSA-surveillance/2014/02/27/id/555118/ 
(last visited on April 14, 2014). 
 12. Red Skies, supra note 4, at 148-49, citing ABA Comm’n. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 08-451] (discussing the 
scope of MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RULE 1.1). 
 13. See id.  
 14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012). 
 15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2012). 
 16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012). 
 17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2012). 
 18. A AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, Report to the House of Delegates, 
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20.html 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
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Rules.19  To provide additional perspective on access to files and documents 
stored in the cloud by federal and state law enforcement agencies in the United 
States other than the intelligence agencies, this article briefly discusses the 
ABA’s 2012 Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third 
Party Records.20 
Part III looks at the differences between “privileged” and “confidential” 
information and the risks to each category of information that the NSA 
surveillance raises.  Part IV discusses enhanced risks to data and storage flowing 
from the formerly secret “back doors” and encryption-breaking practices that 
NSA has introduced into commonly used electronics such as tablets and smart 
phones that allows more surveillance by the NSA and FBI,21 and hacking by 
many potential sources including possibly by clients’ counter-parties.22  This part 
expresses doubts that President Obama’s January 17, 2014 Signals Intelligence 
Directive, 23 which outlines the scope of continuing collection and review of 
telephonic and other electronic communications, will correct the risks to clients’ 
confidential and privileged records in the cloud. 
In Part V, this article briefly discusses lawyers’ and law firms’ duties arising 
under data security breach notification laws enacted by the States and in the 
European Union that arise when their electronic records are hacked, whether in 
their own offices or in the cloud.  Among the sources of data security prevention 
and public responsibility for breaches and notification, it also cites the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.24 
                                                                                                                                   
 19.  See Trope & Hughes, supra note 4, for a fulsome discussion of the pre-2012 version of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 20. AM. BAR ASS’N, Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third 
Party Records, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/law_enforcement_access.html 
(last visited April 14, 2014). 
 21. See Close the N.S.A.’s Back Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, at SR10, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/opinion/sunday/close-the-nsas-back-doors.html?_r=0,  
(mentioning coverage by itself, The Guardian, and ProPublica that the NSA “now has access to the 
codes that protect commerce and banking systems, trade secrets and medical records, and 
everyone’s e-mail and Internet chat messages, including virtual private networks, and encryption 
protecting data on iPhone, Android and BlackBerry phones”). 
 22. See, e.g., E. Michael Maloof, NSA Has Total Access via Microsoft Windows, 
http://www.wnd.com/2013/06/nsa-has-total-access-via-microsoft-windows/ (last visited Apr. 14, 
2014) (citing Joseph Farah, G2 Bulletin, http://g2.wnd.com (Jun. 23, 2013)) (reporting that the 
NSA has “backdoor access to all Windows software since the release of Windows 95” and tying the 
backdoors to “insistence by the agency and federal law enforcement for backdoor “keys” to any 
encryption; providing further that Windows “software driver used for security and encryption 
functions contains unusual features that give the NSA the backdoor access” and  “[s]uch access to 
the encryption system of Windows can allow NSA to compromise a person’s entire operating 
system”). 
 23. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, Signals Intelligence Activities, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 
17, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-
signals-intelligence-activities. 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2010). 
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Part VI first surveys recent, publicly available advice, primarily concerning 
technology tools that address cloud computing risks and solutions.  It also reports 
on increasing client demands that law firms undergo cybersecurity audits 
themselves, and states some conclusions about lawyers’ obligations when using 
cloud computing and storage, including new risks connected to the NSA’s 
telecommunications data-gathering programs and its back-doors and encryption-
busting propensities that threaten lawyers’ ability to use the cloud for storage of 
confidential or privileged communications with and information belonging to 
clients as to require prompt reexamination of such use and renewed efforts to 
inform clients of the potential risks.25 
In Part VII, this articles poses some questions about the future of protecting 
clients’ trade secrets and other highly proprietary information from government 
surveillance and via back doors from competitors’ or other hackers’ intrusions.  
Risks to confidential and privileged data point to the need for some restraint, if 
technologically feasible, on collection by the NSA, FBI and other agencies, of 
communications involving lawyers and law firms with clouds.  Alternatively, 
risks point to a need for post-collection minimization policies that federal 
agencies ought to implement or be forced to implement by the Obama 
Administration or Congress.  This part recommends that lawyers and law firms 
may have no alternative but to revert to relatively old-fashioned approaches to 
protecting clients’ data that is confidential or privileged despite the efficiency 
and economy of the cloud.  These methods include in-person conversations, 
physical storage of tangible records with proper physical and administrative 
safeguards in place to protect them – as well as a really good map of where the 
records are stored, and such old-fashioned ideas as using manual typewriters for 
the most sensitive communications, such as clients’ patent applications and 
merger and acquisition plans. 
II. THE 2012 AMENDMENTS TO THE MODEL RULES  
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Our 2011 Red Skies article included extensive analysis of core duties 
included in the 2007 version of the MRPC,26 particularly, the duties to: 
 
• provide competent representation and, accordingly, to stay abreast of new 
technologies and uses of technologies;27 
 
• obtain clients’ informed consent to the use of cloud storage for communications 
with and documents belonging to clients, including attorney work-product on 
client matters;28 
                                                                                                                                   
 25. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).  
 26. Trope & Hughes, supra note 4 at 137-63. 
 27. Infra at text accompanying notes 57 to 96. 
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• protect confidential information and privileged communications from 
“inadvertent disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the 
representation of a client” by use of reasonable efforts.29  And,  
 
• communicate with clients on various aspects of the representation.30 
 
Amendments to the main text or to the comments accompanying the MRPC 
incorporated in the 2012 amendments to the MRPC31 adjust some of the duties. 
A.  Rule 1.1 Competence 
In Red Skies, Mr. Trope and I argued that Rule 1.1’s mandate for “competent 
representation” included a duty to stay abreast of new technologies and of risks 
related to the use of technologies.32  New Comment [6] to MRPC 1.1 now 
mentions those duties explicitly: 
[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep 
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and 
risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study 
and education and comply with all continuing legal education 
requirements to which the lawyer is subject.33 
B.  Rule 1.4 Communication 
Rule 1.4 was not amended by the American Bar Association in 2012.  It still 
reads: 
 
(a)  A lawyer shall: 
 
 (1)  promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with 
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 
1.0(e), is required by these Rules; 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 28. I Infra at text accompanying notes 97 to 138. 
 29. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, Initial Draft Proposals on Lawyers’ Use of 
Technology and Client Development 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20110629ethics202t
echnologyclientdevelopmentinitialresolutionsandreport.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2012). 
 31. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, Report to the House of Delegates, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_ 
meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 32. Trope & Hughes, supra note 4 at 154. 
 33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 6 (2012) (underlining in original 
demonstrates changes from the 2007 text). 
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 (2)  consult with the client about the means by which the client’s 
objectives are to be accomplished; 
 
 (3)   reasonably keep the clientinformed about the status of the matter; 
 
 (4)   promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 
 
 (5)   consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s 
conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance 
not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
(b)  A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.34 
 
Comment [4] to MRPC 1.4 also was amended in 2012,35 but not, in my view, in a 
manner that alters the recommendations that Mr. Trope and I made in Red 
Skies.36  
Comment 16 to MRPC 1.6 requires lawyers to recognize the risks that 
technology poses, particularly where a third party might have access to the 
information.37  Our 2011 article concluded that “… in addition to recognizing 
risks, to competently safeguard information, the lawyer must similarly assume 
and provide for the fact that third-party communications providers are not likely 
to protect client information as zealously as the client’s advocate should.”38 
 
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information now reads: 
 
(a)  A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the 
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2012). 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4, cmt. 4 (2012) (“Client telephone calls should be 
promptly returned or acknowledged,” was replaced by “[A] lawyer should promptly respond to or 
acknowledge client communications.”). 
 36. Trope & Hughes, supra note 4 at 137-51. 
 37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 16 (2007).  See also ABA Formal Op. 08-
451, supra note 12 (concluding that a lawyer may outsource support services, but recognizing that 
the lawyer ultimately remains responsible for rendering competent legal services to the client). 
 38. Trope & Hughes, supra note 4 at 154, citing New York Op. 842, NEW YORK STATE BAR 
ASS’N COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, Formal Op. 842, ¶ 5 (2010) [hereinafter New York Op. 842], 
available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions/ 
Opinions825present/EO_842.pdf, for the proposition that the exercise of “reasonable care” does not 
require that the lawyer “guarantees that the information is secure from any unauthorized access.” 
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(b)  A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
 
 (1)  to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
 
 (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or 
is using the lawyer’s services; 
 
 (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or 
has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in 
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; 
 
 (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these 
Rules; 
 
 (5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense 
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon 
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations 
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the 
client; or 
 
(6)  to comply with other law or a court order. 
 
(c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information 
relating to the representation of a client. 39 
 
I would make two observations in particular about MRPC 1.6.  First, Rule 
1.6(a) does not contain a qualifying subjective mental element, which its 2007 
predecessor also lacked.40  The continued absence of a “knowing” requirement in 
Rule 1.6(a) means that, absent informed consent, the lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation.41 
Second, new MRPC Rule 1.6 (c) creates a duty that requires lawyers to 
recognize the issues related to drafts stored in the cloud.  These issues include, at 
the minimum, prospects that (1) copies of all documents are made each time that 
a document is moved to the cloud, and (2) standard cloud storage protocols use 
                                                                                                                                   
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012). 
 40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012). 
 41. Trope & Hughes, supra note 4, at 152. 
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back-up storage of multiple copies of documents. 42  Regrettably, lawyers may 
have no knowledge, at any given time, how many copies of a file exist and where 
those copies may be stored.  Copies effectively are all individual documents for 
purposes of e-discovery, whether or not the lawyer or firm knows of their 
existence.  Copies also potentially “reside” in different jurisdictions or nations 
(where privacy and security laws may demand different protections, including no 
protection at all for data originating outside their borders).  Copies also may 
become unavailable via outages to the cloud servers at critical moments with no 
indemnification or reimbursement for associated injuries likely forthcoming from 
the cloud providers.43  These facts complicate the lawyer’s ability to recognize 
and control risks to clients’ confidential and privileged documents and 
communications. 
The Rule also appears to require awareness and, to the extent feasible, 
prevention of newer-age risks in choosing to store data in the cloud including 
both the risk of surveillance by government agencies in the U.S. and abroad44 and 
risks of non-government penetration via the “back doors” introduced into certain 
electronic devices by U.S. agencies.45  Given what we now know of the NSA’s 
practices both alone and in collaboration with friendly intelligence services,46 
prevention could require abandonment of many technologically enabled 
efficiencies – such as conference calls or Skype calls in lieu of travel or of cloud-
shared work products – in favor of old-fashioned communications and storage 
methods mentioned in Part VII of this article. 
 
Accompanying new Rule 1.6(c) are amendments of comments [18] and 
[19].47  Comment [18] to Rule 1.6(c) now provides: 
C.  Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality 
[18] Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard 
information relating to the representation of a client against 
unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are 
                                                                                                                                   
 42. Trope & Hughes, supra note 4, at 224-230. 
 43. Id. at 175-199 (discussion including provisions of cloud contracts on liability to their 
clients). 
 44. See Spy Agency Tracked Passengers for Days through Free Wi-Fi at Major Canadian 
Airport: Report, NAT’L POST, http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/01/31/spy-agency-kept-tabs-on-
passengers-through-wi-fi-at-a-major-canadian-airport-cbc-report/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 45. David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway into Computers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-
open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html?_r=0 (reporting that, since “at least 2008,” the 
NSA has implanted radio-frequency software on 100,000 computers worldwide with capacity to 
conduct surveillance and launch cyber-attacks, but that there is “no evidence” of its use inside the 
United States). 
 46. See Risen & Poitras, supra note 2. 
 47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c), cmt. 18-19 (2012). 
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participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the 
lawyer’s supervision.  See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.  The unauthorized 
access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, information 
relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a violation 
of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent 
the access or disclosure.  Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, 
the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if 
additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing 
additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, 
and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s 
ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece 
of software excessively difficult to use).  A client may require the 
lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this 
Rule or may give informed consent to forego security measures that 
would otherwise be required by this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be 
required to take addition steps to safeguard a client’s information in 
order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that 
govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements on loss of, 
or unauthorized access to, electronic information is beyond the scope of 
these Rules.  For a lawyer’s duties when sharing information with 
nonlawyers outside the lawyer’s own law firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments 
[3]-[4].48 
New comment [19] to Rule 1.6(c) adds the last sentence to what had been in 
the 2007 comment: 
[19] When transmitting a communication that includes information 
relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take 
reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the 
hands of unintended recipients.  This duty, however, does not require 
that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of 
communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Special 
circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions.  Factors to 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s 
expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information 
and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected 
by law or by a confidentiality agreement.  A client may require the 
lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this 
Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of 
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.  
Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to 
                                                                                                                                   
 48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c), cmt. 18 (2012) (underlining original in 
published text of amended comment 19). 
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comply with other law, such as state or federal laws that govern data 
privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.49 
The 2012 amendments also remind lawyers and law firms of their duties to 
protect documents and data covered by confidentiality or privilege rules that 
belong to former clients: 
Former Client 
[20] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer 
relationship has terminated.  See Rule 1.9(c)(2).  See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for 
the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of 
the former client.50 
Accordingly, lawyers’ and law firms’ duties to files, documents, data and 
communications extend beyond the representation and concerns over cloud 
storage apply to information archived in the cloud, to the same extent as they 
apply to active files and clients. 
Based on the information that the NSA’s surveillance of electronic 
communications has been ongoing for many years, it appears that files that 
lawyers and law firms archived in the past could be imperiled as well as more 
recently stored files. 
D.  Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property 
Finally, lawyers’ duties to protect clients’ property are based on Rule 1.15.51  
Subsection 1.15(a), among other things, provides that “…  Other property shall 
be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.”52  The duty to safeguard 
property “appropriately” is the key aspect of this Rule’s relationship to cloud 
computing and other technology uses by lawyers and law firms for the purpose of 
this article. 
In Red Skies, Mr. Trope and I pointed out that outages in the cloud can render 
stored files unavailable for periods of time while the cloud provider recovers 
data, etc.53  We also explained that lawyers and law firms can lose access to 
cloud-stored data by breaching their contracts with cloud providers.54  Thus, the 
risk of losing access to documents temporarily or perhaps permanently in the 
event of a more massive cloud outage or dispute between the lawyer or firm and 
the provider should be considered when lawyers decide whether to store clients’ 
most valuable documents in the cloud and in their choice of cloud providers. 
                                                                                                                                   
 49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c), cmt. 18 (2012) (underlining original in 
published text of new comment 18). 
 50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 20 (2012). 
 51. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2012). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Trope & Hughes, supra note 4, at 175-199. 
 54. Id. at 196-198. 
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This consideration is more important if the only or most recent copies are 
stored in the cloud, as a recent episode in North Carolina revealed.  According to 
media reports, a Charlotte law firm suffered the loss of access to “its entire cache 
of legal documents to the malware program called ‘Cryptolocker Trojan’” despite 
attempts by the principals to pay the $300 ransom the hackers demanded in a bid 
to have the documents unscrambled.55  At least, according to the report, the 
malware only destroyed the ability to read the contents of the stored files, it 
apparently did not steal them.56  However, this may be of less comfort to the firm 
because, assuming that the firm was entirely “paperless” as many strive to be, the 
firm lost documents of value to its clients and to its relationship with clients. 
III. DID NSA DATA CAPTURE DESTROY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE OR 
WAIVE CONFIDENTIALITY STATUS FOR CLIENTS’ FILES AND DATA THAT 
LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS STORED IN THE CLOUD? 
In this part of the article, we come to the heart of concerns that explicitly 
relate to surveillance of communications, including telephonic and transmissions 
to cloud storage of files that lawyers hold or work on with clients.  Privilege and 
confidentiality are separate concepts and will be discussed in turn below. 
A.  Attorney-Client Privilege and NSA Surveillance 
According to a leading commentator on the attorney-client privilege, 
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.: 
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of 
the modern American lawyer’s professional functions.  It is considered 
indispensable to the lawyer’s function as advocate on the theory that 
the advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to 
disclose everything, bad as well as good.  The privilege is also 
considered necessary to the function as confidential counselor in law on 
the similar theory that the legal counselor can properly advise the client 
what to do only if the client is free to make full disclosure.57 
But Professor Hazard also observed that attorney-client privilege “is invoked to 
conceal legally dubious or dirty business.  And when dubious or dirty business 
has been done, most likely someone has suffered as a result.  In the nature of 
things, then the attorney-client privilege has its victims.”58  Moreover, he 
suggested: 
                                                                                                                                   
 55. See John E. Dunn, Cryptolocker Scrambles US Law Firm’s Entire Cache of Legal 
Files, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/security/ 
3501150/cryptolocker-scambles-us-law-firms-entire-cache-of-legal-files/. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 
CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978) available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/ 
californialawreview/vol66/iss5/5. 
 58. Id. at 1062. 
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In the present-day law [circa 1978], the issue concerning the 
attorney-client privilege is not whether it should exist, but precisely 
what its terms should be.  There is no responsible opinion suggesting 
that the privilege be completely abolished.  Total abolition would mean 
that an accused in a criminal case could not explain his version of the 
matter to his lawyer without its being transmitted to the prosecution.  
Defense counsel would become a medium of confession, a result that 
would substantially impair both the accused’s right to counsel and the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Hence, it is common ground that 
the privilege ought to apply at least to communications by an accused 
criminal to his counsel, in contemplation of defense of a pending or 
imminently threatened prosecution, concerning a completed crime.  
Beyond this there is controversy as to the proper scope of the privilege, 
although superficially the authorities are in substantial agreement. 59 
Against this backdrop, we have evidence of one of the most bizarre examples 
of surveillance of lawyer-client communications that has come to light recently.  
I speak of reports published in early 2014 that via its Australian counterpart, the 
Australian Signals Directorate, the Directorate received and shared with the NSA 
the fact of communications between the DC office of a major U.S.-based law 
firm and its client, the government of Indonesia, related to a trade dispute 
between the two governments.60  Apparently, not only did the Signals Directorate 
pass the communications – so far unspecified in their form – to the NSA, the 
NSA reputed shared the communications with “a client,” whose identity one can 
infer was the White House, Department of Commerce, or the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, the counter-party in the trade dispute.61 
There is a bit of good news that follows the revelations about capture of the 
communications between Mayer Brown, the firm reportedly involved, and its 
client.  Following publication of the story, I discussed it with several faculty 
colleagues to obtain their sense of the damage to a client’s actual privileged 
communications with its lawyer.  Here is how one senior colleague responded:   
A privilege is personal property.  It belongs to the 
person/corporation that made the communication.  The person must 
have intended it to be confidential forever, and it must have been 
confidential in fact.  Only the behavior of the holder of the privilege or 
their agents can waive it, expressly or implicitly or sometimes 
negligently.  Therefore, in most jurisdictions, intercepted 
                                                                                                                                   
 59. Id. at 1062-1063.  As background for the balance of his argument, Professor Hazard also 
cited Uniform Rules of Evidence Rule 26, the ALI Model Code of Evidence rule 212 (1942), and 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence rule 502, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).  Uniform Rules of Evidence 
rule 26, at that time, provided that the lawyer-client privilege applies to “communications … 
between lawyer and his client in the course of that relationship and in professional confidence … 
unless the legal service was sought or obtained to commit or plan to commit a crime or tort ….” 
Hazard, supra note 56, at 1063, citing UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 26. 
 60. Risen & Poitras, supra note 3. 
 61. Id. 
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communications, even under warrant, are still privileged.  But that only 
means that they cannot be used in court proceedings. 
If the information is communicated voluntarily or knowingly to a 
third party with whom the speaker does not have an independent 
privileged relationship, it is no longer privileged, although it may still 
be confidential for various regulatory purposes. 62 
A second colleague added the following useful perspective, among others: 
. . . When the NSA surrepticiously intercepts communications, this is 
not the kind of context in which a party purposefully or intentionally 
waives the confidentiality of their communication.  Therefore, as a 
doctrinal matter, the notion of “waiver” should not be extended to 
apply to communications surrepticiously intercepted by the 
government.  As well, from a practical and a policy perspective, the 
opposite rule would allow the government to intercept confidential 
communications – even in cases between plaintiffs and the government 
– and then argue that confidential attorney-client communications are 
not protected by attorney-client privilege.  This seems problematic for a 
number of reasons.63 
I asked a third colleague and he responded: 
. . . I think the federal approach is that where the law does not prohibit 
intrusion into a FISA A-C communication, the government 
nevertheless must take reasonable steps to protect any information 
collected, shared, etc.  If there are Attorney General procedures on this 
topic it would be valuable to have the professional community review, 
comment, and advise on them.64 
Thus, it would appear that communications between lawyer and client 
intercepted by the NSA or received by the NSA and other U.S. agencies should 
be entitled to lawyer-privilege if the issue arises in a court proceeding.65  But a 
different rule might apply – though also might not be applied – not if the issue 
arises in another forum, like negotiations over a trade dispute.  And, certainly, in 
negotiations the privilege may be less important than the loss of confidentiality 
for the information intercepted as to data or strategy. 
                                                                                                                                   
 62. Email from Law Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, to author (February 
24, 2014) (on file with the author). 
 63. Email from a second Law Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, to author 
(February 24, 2014) (on file with the author). 
 64. Email from a third Law Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, to author 
(February 25, 2014) (on file with the author). 
 65. See supra note 62; see also supra note 63; see also supra note 64. 
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B.  Confidentiality and Documents Stored in Clouds and, Presumably, Subjected 
to NSA Surveillance 
The North Carolina law firm described above at least did not have their files 
stolen, just rendered unusable by everyone, including their clients.  Although 
unusable, the confidentiality of the files was (apparently) not breached. 
But let’s think about the other law firm whose communications and shared 
work products likely contained information about the trade dispute that the client 
government considered confidential.  What happens now?  Did the law firm 
violate the duty to keep clients’ confidential data confidential? 
As explained above, the 2012 Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose 
on lawyers’ duties to keep clients’ confidential information confidential.  This 
duty is explained, once again, in the following terms by new comment [19] to 
Rule 1.6(c): 
[19] When transmitting a communication that includes information 
relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take 
reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the 
hands of unintended recipients.  This duty, however, does not require 
that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of 
communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Special 
circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions.  Factors to 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s 
expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information 
and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected 
by law or by a confidentiality agreement.  A client may require the 
lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this 
Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of 
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.  
Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to 
comply with other law, such as state or federal laws that govern data 
privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.66 
Presumably, before the 2013 Snowden releases about the scope of NSA’s 
interceptions, lawyers and law firms might not have imagined that their 
telephonic communications would be intercepted and digested – or that no court 
would authorize such interceptions in the context of a trade dispute. 
But how about in this post-Snowden environment?  There are two options, 
apparently.  First, the client may require the lawyer to employ special security 
measures.  Second, the client may give informed consent to the use of 
communications means that do not comply with the requirements of Rule 1.6.  
Either way, the lawyer and his or her clients must have conversations about the 
new risks to confidentiality that NSA interceptions now pose – and come to an 
                                                                                                                                   
 66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c), comm. (2012) (underlining original in 
published text of new comment). 
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agreement about how the client wishes communications to be handled and 
protected.  As described above, the client must make an informed consent – and 
this means that the lawyer knows enough about various technologies and the 
risks they may present to enable a frank and thorough conversation about the 
risks before the client makes its decision.  It means that many more lawyers will 
have to learn a lot more about certain technologies and follow the literature and 
jurisprudence about NSA and other government interceptions than ever before. 
IV. SHOULD REVELATIONS ABOUT THE NSA’S ACTIONS AFFECT LAWYERS’ USE 
OF CLOUD COMPUTING? WHAT LIMITS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES’ ACCESS TO CLIENTS’ DATA HELD BY 
LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS IN CLOUDS? 
Subpart A of this part briefly discusses enhanced risks to lawyers’ use of 
telecom and cloud computing and storage flowing from the secret “back doors” 
that the NSA secretly introduced into commonly used electronics such as tablets 
and smart phones.67  Subpart B introduces the 2012 American Bar Association 
Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records.68 
A.  NSA Data Mining 
Commentators have assumed that the “back doors” that the NSA introduced 
into electronics were intended to allow more surveillance by the NSA and FBI.69  
They also express concerns that the back doors enable hacking by many potential 
sources including possibly by clients’ counter-parties.70  The topic of demonstrate 
how data held by one government agency could be misused by hackers came up 
at a recent House Financial Services Committee hearing.  During questioning 
about his agency’s collection of consumer credit transaction records, Director 
Richard Cordray of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau responded that he 
could not guarantee their safety to 100%.71 
                                                                                                                                   
 67. See, e.g., Maloof, supra note 22 (reporting that the NSA has “backdoor access to all 
Windows software since the release of Windows 95” and tying the backdoors to “insistence by the 
agency and federal law enforcement for backdoor ‘keys’ to any encryption.”). 
 68. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 20. 
 69. See Maloof, supra note 22. 
 70. Id.  (report that the Windows “software driver used for security and encryption functions 
contains unusual features that give the NSA the backdoor access” and that “[s]uch access to the 
encryption system of Windows can allow NSA to compromise a person’s entire operating system”). 
 71. Richard Pollack, Federal consumer bureau data-mining hundreds of millions of consumer 
credit card accounts, mortgages, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan. 28, 2014, 6:13 PM), 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/consumer-bureau-data-mining-hundreds-of-millions-of-consumer-
credit-card-accounts-mortgages/article/2543039 (explaining that hackers could “reverse engineer” 
data to find consumers to which records pertain). 
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B.  ABA Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records 
One area of risk to the confidentiality and privilege of clients’ documents and 
data that has been largely ignored since Edward Snowden’s revelations about the 
NSA data-collection practices relates to other, non-national security law 
enforcement agencies.  These agencies might be interested in clients’ records and 
communications in connection with the prevention and investigation of crimes, 
including money laundering and tax evasion, completeness of responses to 
agencies’ investigations into compliance with federal securities or commodities 
or consumer credit or privacy protection laws, or for other investigatory 
purposes. 
Agency interest in data stored with various institutional parties, including law 
firms, implicates the “third party records” doctrine that the United States 
Supreme Court articulated from the 1960’s to 1980’s.  This doctrine has come 
under criticism since the advent of email, global positioning devices, social 
media, and cloud computing.  The two primary Supreme Court decisions related 
to the “third-party-records” doctrine are United States v. Miller,72 and Smith v. 
Maryland.73 
In response in part to growing concerns about telecommunications and other 
access to third-party records by all levels of government, the American Bar 
Association in 2012 updated its Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Third 
Party Records.74  Of particular relevance to the topic of this paper are Standards 
25-4.1 (Categories of Information), 25-4.2 (Categories of Protection), and 25-5.3 
(Requirements for Access to Records).  These rules provide: 
1.  Standard 25-4.1 Categories of information 
Types of information maintained by institutional third parties should be 
classified as highly private, moderately private, minimally private, or not 
private.  In making that determination, a legislature, court, or 
administrative agency should consider present and developing 
technology and the extent to which: 
(a)  the initial transfer of such information to an institutional third party 
is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or in 
commerce, or is socially beneficial, including to freedom of speech and 
association; 
                                                                                                                                   
 72. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that no person should have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information they voluntarily conveyed to a third party). 
 73. 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding installation at telephone company offices and use of a pen 
register was not a “search” and required no warrant because the individual target of the pen register 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in records at the telephone company offices). 
 74. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records, in ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/third_party_
access.authcheckdam.pdf.  These Standards are not applicable to access related to a national 
security investigation.  Id. at 5. 
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(b) such information is personal, including the extent to which it is 
intimate and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and 
whether outside of the initial transfer to an institutional third party it is 
typically disclosed only within one’s close social network, if at all; 
(c) such information is accessible to and accessed by non-government 
persons outside the institutional third party; and 
(d) existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or allows access 
to and dissemination of such information or of comparable information. 
2.  Standard 25-4.2 Categories of protection 
(a) The type of authorization required for obtaining a record should 
depend upon the privacy of the type of information in that record, such 
that:  records containing highly private information should be highly 
protected, records containing moderately private information should be 
moderately protected, records containing minimally private information 
should be minimally protected, and records containing information that 
is not private should be unprotected.  If a record contains different types 
of information, it should be afforded the level of protection appropriate 
for the most private type it contains. 
(b) If the limitation imposed by subdivision (a) would render law 
enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount of 
otherwise solvable or preventable crime, such that the benefits of 
respecting privacy are outweighed by this social cost, a legislature may 
consider reducing, to the limited extent necessary to correct his 
imbalance, the level of protection for that type of information, so long as 
doing so does not violate the federal or applicable state constitution. 
3.  Standard 25-5.3 Requirements for access to records 
(a) Absent more demanding constitutional protection, consent pursuant 
to Standard 25-5.1, and emergency aid and exigent circumstances 
pursuant to Standard 25-5.4; and consistent with the privilege 
requirements of Standard 5.3(c); law enforcement should be permitted to 
access a record maintained by an institutional third party pursuant to the 
following authorization:   
(i) a court order under 5.2(a)(i) if the record contains highly 
protected information; 
(ii) a court order under 5.2(a)(ii) [5.2(a)(iii) or 5.2(a)(iv)] if the 
record contains moderately protected information; or  
(iii) a subpoena under 5.2(b) if the record contains minimally 
protected information. 
(b) If the record contains highly protected information, a legislature, a 
court acting in its supervisory capacity, or an administrative agency 
could consider more demanding restraints for access to the record, such 
as additional administrative approval, additional disclosure, greater 
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investigative need, or procedures for avoiding access to irrelevant 
information. 
(c) The protections afforded to privileged information contained in 
records maintained by institutional third parties and the responsibilities 
of privilege holders to assert those privileges are those provided by the 
law applicable in the jurisdiction in which privilege is asserted.  The 
jurisdiction in which law enforcement obtains documents may impose 
obligations on both institutional third parties to protect what might be 
privileged information and on law enforcement with respect to the 
access to, and storage and disclosure of, such information. 
To the extent that the NSA obtains this information in the course of its data-
collection efforts, a further question arises about the extent to which the NSA 
should be entitled to access the full content and to share it with other law 
enforcement agencies without observing otherwise applicable legal process 
protections.75  Standard 25-4.2 specifically mentions privilege among the factors 
that law enforcement should take into account in accessing data, but it is unclear 
that such niceties are being observed. 
V.  WHAT DATA SECURITY BREACH LAWS APPLY  
TO LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS? 
This part of this paper summarizes sources of data breach security law that 
generally applies to business enterprises, a classification that includes law firms 
in some cases. 
                                                                                                                                   
 75. See Risen & Poitras, supra note 3, at A 18.  The reporters also stated:   
The [NSA] is barred from sharing with prosecutors intercepted attorney-client 
communications involving someone under indictment in the United States, 
according to previously disclosed N.S.A. rules.  But the agency may still use or 
share the information for intelligence purposes. 
. . .  
. . . disclosures in recent months from the documents leaked by Mr. Snowden 
show the agency routinely spies on trade negotiations, communications of 
economic officials of other countries, and even foreign corporations. 
Id.  Risen and Poitras also cited the fact that the NSA, following interception of communications of 
Americans as the DC lawyers may be, is “required to follow so-called minimization rules to protect 
their privacy, such as deleting the identity of Americans or information that is not deemed 
necessary to understand or access the foreign intelligence before sharing it with other agencies.”  
Id. 
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A.  State Data Security Breach Laws 
Lawyers and law firms are subject to a multitude of non-uniform state data 
security breach laws,76 as well as, depending on the nature of the data, federal 
laws including HIPPA,77 and other guidance from the federal government, such 
as the FFEIC Guidance.78 
Legislation requiring private entities, or government entities subject to their 
jurisdiction, to notify individuals of data security breaches that involve breaches 
of information that includes personally identifiable information, has been enacted 
by 46 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands.79  States with no security breach laws include Alabama, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, and South Dakota.80 
Security breach laws typically have provisions regarding who must comply 
with the law (e.g., businesses, data/ information brokers, government entities, 
etc.); definitions of “personal information” (e.g., name combined with SSN, 
driver’s license or state ID, account numbers, etc.); what constitutes a breach 
(e.g., unauthorized acquisition of data); requirements for notice (e.g., timing and 
method of notice, who must be notified); and exemptions (e.g., for encrypted 
information).81 
Lawyers’ and law firms’ ability to rely on the “safe harbors” for encrypted 
data that appear in state data security breach laws82 appears to be diminishing 
proportionately to the new risks that arise as the NSA pursues encryption-
breaking capacities.83 
                                                                                                                                   
 76. See Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach 
Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 382 (2006) (outlining the numerous differences in 
state data security laws). 
 77. See generally The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified variously in 42 U.S.C.). 
 78. See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, Data Security, IT 
EXAMINATION HANDBOOK INFOBASE, http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/information-
security/security-controls-implementation/data-security.aspx (last visited May. 8, 2014). 
 79. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State Security Breach Notification Laws, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx (updated as of Jan. 21, 2014) (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).  A listing of the 
citations to these state laws is in Appendix 2 to this paper. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  However, not all States define the term “encryption” and, when defined, the standards 
are not uniform.  See Eric Hibbard, Data Breaches and the Encryption Safe Harbor, at 25, 2012 
power point presentation, STORAGE NETWORKING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, available at 
https://www.snia.org/sites/default/education/tutorials/2012/fall/security/EricHibbard_Data-Breach-
Encryption-Safe-Harbor_Final.pdf (citing Data Breach Laws:  Will They Save or Sink You in a 
Massive Attack?, RSA Conference 2012, Session:  LAW-203 (February 2012)). 
 82. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, Data Breach Charts (2013), http://www.bakerlaw.com/ 
files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Breach_Charts.pdf (listing states 
with data breach notification requirements). 
 83. Steven Rich & Barton Gellman, NSA Seeks to Build Quantum Computer that Could Crack 
Most Types of Encryption, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-
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B.  Federal Trade Commission Section 5 Jurisdiction 
In addition, lawyers and law firms are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and its “unfair and deceptive acts or practices 
in commerce” jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.84  The FTC has not yet used this jurisdiction against lawyers or law firms 
that experienced a data security breach.  The FTC has used Section 5 against 
corporations in its jurisdiction that have suffered data security breaches, 
including its June, 2012 complaint against the collection of affiliates that own 
and operate Wyndham hotels.85  Paragraph 2 of the Complaint summarizes the 
basis for the FTC’s action: 
Defendants’ failure to maintain reasonable security allowed intruders to 
obtain unauthorized access to the computer networks of Wyndham 
Hotels and Resorts, LLC, and several hotels franchised and managed 
by Defendants on three separate occasions in less than two years. 
Defendants’ security failures led to fraudulent charges on consumers’ 
accounts, more than $10.6 million in fraud loss, and the export of 
hundreds of thousands of consumers’ payment card account 
information to a domain registered in Russia.  In all three security 
breaches, hackers accessed sensitive consumer data by compromising 
Defendants’ Phoenix, Arizona data center.86 
As a result, lawyers and law firms who fail to maintain reasonable security and 
whose failure “allows” unauthorized persons to gain access to their networks, 
documents stored in clouds, or long-term archives cause injury to their clients, 
could be vulnerable to suit by the FTC as well as by their clients. 
C.  Other Sources of Data Breach Liability for Lawyers and Law Firms 
1.  The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive 
Law firms that operate in the European Union as well as the United States – 
or who have clients who reside in the European Union’s states – should already 
be familiar with the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive.87  The Directive 
prohibits transfer of data pertaining to residents unless comparable data 
protection is afforded by the nation in which the transferee is located.88  Disputes 
                                                                                                                                   
encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html (expressing skepticism 
that the NSA has achieved its goal as of now). 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2011). 
 85. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation, 2:12-cv-01365-SPL (D. Ariz. filed June 26, 2012). 
 86. Id. ¶ 2. 
 87. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
 88. Id. 
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prior to the NSA data-gathering disclosures prompted the EU and United States 
to enter into an agreement providing procedures for enterprises in the United 
States to comply with the EU’s requirements when they house or import data 
from the EU.89 
Of fresh, post-Snowden interest to lawyers and law firms operating under the 
Safe Harbor or with intentions to do business in the EU or represent clients in the 
EU is the EU justice commissioner’s recent call for bigger fines for breaches of 
European data security laws.90 
And, lawyers should become aware of, to the extent that they are not already 
preparing to act on, proposals by Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany to 
“create European data networks that would keep emails and other 
communications on the European side of the Atlantic, farther from prying 
American eyes…”91 
2.  Should Lawyers Consider Taking “Commercially Reasonable” Steps to 
Protect Data from Breaches and What Would Such Steps Entail? 
In connection with their responsibilities and responsive strategies they may 
decide to employ, lawyers and law firms vulnerable to data security breach 
actions should ask themselves “what is commercially reasonable security?”  As 
explained by one commentator, 
As most data breach class actions have been dismissed for lack of 
damages, courts generally have not examined what might constitute 
reasonable data security when [private] plaintiffs allege negligence.  
Although several states have data security laws that require businesses 
                                                                                                                                   
 89. For comprehensive information about the “safe harbor” requirements, see Welcome to the 
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2014).  For text of the EU document approving the safe harbor agreements, see 
2000/520/EC:  Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe 
harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce (notified under document number C(2000) 2441) (Text with EEA relevance), available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32000D0520.  Among the 
requirements is a condition on “onward transfers” of data, which may occur only to organizations 
that follow adequate data protection principles.  Id.  It would seem that the NSA and its contractor 
who employed Snowden would be ineligible for the safe harbor. 
 90. See EU Calls for Much Bigger Fines for Data Breaches, BBC NEWS TECH. (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25825690 (reporting on statements by Viviane Reding, 
Commissioner of Justice of the European Union & Vice President of the European Commission, 
about plans to create a single EU regulator and to impose much larger fines for data security 
breaches).  The EU is also considering proposals to prevent European data from being shared with 
another country in response to Edward Snowden’s allegations.  See id.  Recent fines levied against 
Google in the EU exceeded 1.05 million Euros.  See Lee Munson, EU Commissioner Calls for 
Larger Data Security Breach Fines (Jan. 22, 2014), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/ 
2014/01/22/eu-commissioner-calls-for-larger-data-breach-fines/. 
 91. Alison Smale, Merkel Backs Plan to Keep European Data in Europe, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 17, 
2014, at A6. 
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to adopt reasonable security measures to protect personal information . 
. . [t]hose statutes do not define what constitutes reasonable data 
security.  However, in a different context, the First Circuit recently 
addressed reasonable security under Article 4A of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  In a case that likely will have wide ranging 
implications for financial institutions and perhaps other businesses, the 
court in Patco Construction Co. v. People’s United Bank held that a 
bank failed to provide commercially reasonable security to protect a 
consumer from fraud.  The security procedures proved commercially 
unreasonable, in part, because the bank posed the same challenge 
questions for high-risk transactions that it did for ordinary transactions, 
which was particularly troubling given the prevalence of key-logging 
malware, about which the bank had been cautioned by its consultants.92 
The court’s fact-intensive opinion demonstrates that the crux of security 
procedures will be the use – serious or superficial – a bank, or any business, 
makes of them.93 
Another commentator made two other highly instructive observations about 
the First Circuit’s holding in Patco.94  He noted, first, that failure to take action 
when a security alert triggers a security protocol, not only “may render security 
procedures ‘commercially unreasonable’ under the U.C.C. Article 4A and, 
second, that it “may deprive an originator’s bank of the risk allocations and 
liability limits it sought in its online banking agreement with its customer.”95  
Translating the sage counsel offered by both of these commentators, lawyers and 
law firms should be certain that they comply with any cybersecurity policies they 
establish, they re-evaluate how well they work periodically, and conduct regular 
training and re-training of all personnel to ensure maximum utility of their 
policies. 
3.  Domestic Laws 
Other prospective liability may arise under common law negligence, per se 
negligence, breach of contract, the common law covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and unjust enrichment/restitution.96 
 
VI. WHAT RESPONSIBLE STRATEGIES AND STEPS CAN LAWYERS  
AND LAW FIRMS CONSIDER IN RESPONSE TO THREATS POSED  
                                                                                                                                   
 92. John Black, Developments in Data Security Breach Liability, 69 BUS. LAW. 199, 206 
(2013) (footnotes omitted) (citing Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s State Bank, 684 F. 3d 197 (1st Cir. 
2012)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Roland L. Trope, Bearings from the Southern Cross: Cybersecurity Decisions 2012-2013, 
69 BUS. LAW. 189, 190 (Nov. 2013). 
 95. Id. at 190 (footnotes omitted). 
 96. Black, supra note 92, at 201-202. 
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BY HACKERS AND GOVERNMENTS? 
The NSA revelations should challenge lawyers’ and law firms to do more to 
secure the communications they have with and work-product and client-related 
documents they may have in storage or transmission.  The 2012 Amendments to 
the MRPC raise the stakes for law firms in terms of protecting data and obtaining 
informed consent.97  Surveillance activities like the NSA’s also increase the 
problems that lawyers and law firms have in dealing with risks to data security 
and in responding to hacking incidents and internal data theft in terms of state- 
and EU-enacted data security breach notification responsibilities. 
Additionally, high-profile data security breaches, such as that experienced by 
Target in late 2013, demonstrate that breaches can be perpetrated via 
vulnerabilities that exist in the systems of vendors whose software is allowed to 
interface with too many internal systems of their customers.98 
President Obama’s January 17, 2014 Directive on Signals Intelligence99 does 
not reduce concerns related to files sent among computers, tablets, and other 
media that we identified in Red Skies in 2011.  Its failure to prohibit future 
actions such as the NSA-introduced “back-door” vulnerabilities also enhances 
risks to law firms’ and lawyers’ communications and clients’ data and files.  The 
current state of play in the United States does not relieve lawyers and law firms 
in the United States from duties they have if they hold data pertaining to residents 
of the European Union or Canada from storage where it is accessible by the NSA 
contrary to EU provisions, and it does not absolve them from liability under the 
data security breach laws of the States or the European Union, described briefly 
in this article.  This is in part because the penetration of firm-applied encryption 
undercuts lawyers’ and law firms’ ability100 to qualify for “safe harbors” found in 
many data security breach notification laws here and abroad.101  It does nothing 
to quell concerns that Americans’ communications with clients abroad will be 
protected by suitable minimization procedures or stopped when the 
                                                                                                                                   
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 26-46. 
 98. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Target Breach:  Phishing Attack Implicated, INFO. WEEK (Feb. 
13, 2014), http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks-and-breaches/target-breach-phishing-
attack-implicated/d/d-id/1113829 (mentioning a Pennsylvania-based HVAC vendor); Nicole 
Perlroth, Heat System Called Door to Target for Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/technology/heat-system-called-door-to-target-for-
hackers.html?_r=0 (reporting that vendors may have remote access to systems that create 
vulnerabilities). 
 99. Presidential Policy Directive/ PPD-28, supra note 23. 
 100. See Cracked Credibility, THE ECONOMIST (Sep. 14, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21586296-be-safe-internet-needs-reliable-
encryption-standards-software-and; N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sep. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-
encryption.html?pagewanted=1. 
 101. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 82 (providing information about states that link 
their data security breach notification “safe harbors” to data encryption).  Numerous states limit 
application of their notification requirements to data that is not encrypted (e.g., Ohio, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts). Id. at 15-17. 
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communications involve sensitive issues that traditional concepts of privilege and 
confidentiality are implicated. 
The stakes are about to become greater for lawyers and law firms.  Relatively 
new demands by clients for their outside law firms to undergo cybersecurity 
audits adds to the pressures on lawyers and law firms to get their cybersecurity 
houses in order.  In mid-2013, press reports revealed that Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch was “auditing the cybersecurity policies at its outside law firms, 
partly under pressure from government regulators.”102  This raises the question, 
as one commentator put it, “Would Your Firm Pass A Data Security Audit?”103  
Target’s experience demonstrates that firms should consider whether their 
vendors will subject them to security breaches.104 
All told, the revelations about the scope of the U.S. government’s 
surveillance of telecom and other data and its “back door” capabilities, breaches 
at retailers such as Target, and the heightened responsibilities set forth in the 
MRPC should cause law firms and solo practitioners to (a) review their current 
data security policies and facilities and breach notification protocols and (b) re-
think where and how files and data related to active projects as well as to 
archived projects should be managed and stored.  The most sensitive data, legally 
and from the perspective of risks to the firm’s reputation, should be reviewed and 
stored the most carefully to maintain the greatest degree of protection for the 
confidential and privileged information it contains. 
To evaluate what advice lawyers and law firms already may have about how 
they may satisfy their duties under the MRPC, described above, to protect clients 
and their data, I surveyed advice given recently in public forums to lawyers and 
law firms seeking to fulfill their important data-protection responsibilities.  From 
the plethora of sources of such advice, I identified tasks that lawyers and firms 
might be encouraged to take to ensure greater protection for their clients’ and the 
firm’s data as well as some corollaries.  The most salient recent pieces of advice 
encourage lawyers and law firms to: 
 
1.  Understand what types of data you hold on clients’ behalf, and the relative 
risks that each type of data may present. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 102. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Clients Demand Law Firm Cyber Audits, LAW PRAC. 
MAG., Nov. 2013, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2013/ 
november-december/hot-buttons.html (providing a 17-step program for law firms to survive 
clients’ cybersecurity audits of their data policies). 
 103. See Would Your Firm Pass A Data Security Audit?, LAWBIZ MGMT. (Jul. 11, 2013), 
http://www.lawbiz.com/coachs_corner_7-11-2013.html (providing a very brief checklist of the 
major categories of services and storage that lawyers should check on as they evaluate how secure 
their data and conduct is, including “enterprise security,” “wireless security,” “cloud security,” 
“email security,” and “insurance coverage.”). 
 104. See generally supra note 98. 
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For example, one expert suggests classifying data in terms of three levels of 
sensitivity and reviewing whether the security procedures are sufficient in 
light of the differing risks.105  These classes include:  “public” information 
that is accessible to the public and that poses little risk to the firm’s 
reputation, including information on the firm’s public website;106 “sensitive 
or confidential” information that could have a moderately adverse effect on 
the firm’s reputation such as data covered by non-disclosure agreements, 
competitive market research, and the like;107 and “restricted” information that 
poses the highest risks to reputation including HIPPA data, non-public 
personal information about clients, employees and clients’ counter-parties, or 
the formula for Coca Cola.108 
 
But even more importantly, to understand where information relative to 
operational issues (how many people need to staff a project in a company) 
and 
 
2.  Decide where the highest-value data should be stored and how access to it 
will be protected.  One basis for choosing private clouds, as opposed to 
public clouds, for high-sensitivity data is that if a government agency or 
other person wants access to it via a form of legal process, at least the firm 
knows about it.109 
 
3.  Identify the cloud computing adoptions across the office or firm and the 
identity and the terms on which each cloud provider is operating with your 
office or firm.110 
 
4.  Determine which providers are involved in public and private clouds in 
use or that have been used.  Read the contracts with each provider and any 
amendments to them since original execution.111 
                                                                                                                                   
 105. Karen Deuschle, Five Things Your IT Department Wants You to Know About Data 
Security, CORP. COUNS. CONNECT (Jan. 2014), https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/ 
signup/newsletters/corporate-counsel-connect/2014-jan/article5.aspx [hereinafter Five Things]. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See John P. Mello, Jr., NSA Revelations a Mixed Bag for Private Clouds, CSO ONLINE 
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.csoonline.com/article/738084/nsa-revelations-a-mixed-bag-for-
private-clouds (citing Steve Weis, CTO and co-founder of PrivateCore).  According to Von Welch, 
Deputy Director of Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, the security of 
the cloud depends “technically on the acumen of those running the cloud.”  Email from Von Welch 
to Sarah Jane Hughes (Feb. 2, 2014) (on file with the author). 
 110.  See Matt Asay, IT’s Losing Battle Against Cloud Adoption, READWRITE.COM (Jan. 31, 
2014),  http://readwrite.com/2014/01/31/it-losing-battle-cloud-adoption- 
enterprise#awesm=~oA0MDGBXRcSHif (estimating that IT departments underestimate cloud 
adoptions within their firms “by about 10 times” and that many firms use public clouds such 
as AWS “without officially acknowledging it”). 
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5.  Raise all employees’ understanding of the importance of strong data 
security habits.  One commentator suggests specific annual training 
programs, as well as other steps such as requiring different passwords for 
different sites or applications, restricting software downloads to trusted sites, 
verifying installation of anti-virus software and firewalls, and locking 
computers before leaving them (even for short periods) and not storing 
sensitive data on removable media.112 
 
6.  Consider the affect on representation of clients if the storage services your 
firm uses, whether internal, outsourced, or in the cloud, became unavailable 
or was compromised.113 
 
7.  Create a master protocol that addresses various aspects of data 
management and security, including non-technical legal requirements for 
privacy rights, non-U.S. and out-of-state data security standards and breach 
notifications, and the like.  This could include the firm’s business continuity 
plan, disaster recovery plan, incident response plan, physical security plan, 
and bring-your-own-device/ bring-your-own-network policies.114 
8.  Be prepared for requests by clients for the firm to undergo an information 
security audit.115 
 
9.  Consider the greater risks of having computing devices on higher floors of 
buildings because the computer’s emanations become easier to intercept.116 
 
10.  Expect data security vigilance from everyone in the firm and take 
prompt corrective action including re-training or sanctions against those who 
do not meet protocols or expectations.117 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 111. See Trope & Hughes, supra note 4, at 185-198 (discussing different cloud providers’ 
contracts and their amendments to 2011). 
 112. See id. 
 113. Id.  See also Five Things, supra note 105.  Ms. Deuschle also recommends asking about 
the certifications that the cloud service provider you use or plan to use may have – viz., SOC 1, 
SOC 2, or SOC 3, ISO 27001, NIST 800-53, and CSA’s Security, Trust & Assurance Registry 
(known as STAR) as well as asking whether the provider performs regular “penetration tests” using 
independent firms to identify risks in the application so that remedies can be devised before the 
breach can occur.  See id. 
 114. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 102. 
 115. Event Announcement, Surviving a Law Firm Information Security Audit, THE AM. LAW 
INST. & THE AM. BAR ASS’N LAW PRAC. DIVISION, Feb. 24, 2014, http://www.ali-
cle.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=courses.course&course_code=TSVM14.  See also Nelson & Simek, 
supra note 102. 
 116. See Trope & Hughes, supra note 4, at 148 (citing Michael A. Caloyannides, Forensics is 
so “Yesterday”, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 21). 
 117. See Five Things, supra note 105. 
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11.  Consider, if the client base includes clients not domiciled in the United 
States, the additional ethical requirements placed on lawyers and firms 
operating where those clients are based, and the likelihood that clients – or 
their governments – will demand that data related to their interests and 
persons be stored where it can enjoy the highest degree of protection from 
U.S. government surveillance. 
 
12.  Create and maintain a diagram showing where the firm’s data is 
stored.118 
 
13.  Never let control of your digital assets out of your sight.119 
 
14.  Never give an order for security that you cannot obtain or you know will 
be disobeyed.120  Users seek short cuts.  Law firms are not likely to be 
different. 
 
15.  Law firms and lawyers should not bring any client data on laptops to 
meetings abroad and do not seek to receive client data while they are abroad, 
particularly if the travel involves certain nations more inclined to search 
electronics at their borders, such as the United States and China.  Care also 
occasionally mandates routing of travelers who have knowledge of 
significant high-value details away from certain nations if they are traveling 
with or have substantive personal knowledge of trade secrets and the like.121 
 




17.  Whatever else lawyers or law firms may do to protect their clients, never 
take clients’ privileged or confidential data from the office on a laptop and 
then leave the laptop unattended.123 
 
However helpful the items on the list above may seem, the big question 
remains whether what lawyers and law firms do will satisfy lawyers or their 
clients that clients’ documents and data stored in the cloud are safe from 
unexpected or excessive government access or from other unauthorized access.  
                                                                                                                                   
 118. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 102. 
 119. Cormac Herley, More is Not the Answer, SECURITY & PRIVACY, IEEE, Jan.-Feb. 2014, at 
16. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Conversation with Roland L. Trope, February 2, 2014. 
 122. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 102. 
 123. Susan Gainen, 6 Rules for Protecting Confidential Information, LAWYERIST (May 8, 2010), 
http://lawyerist.com/rules-for-protecting-confidential-information/. 
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Also, clients are likely to express concerns about whether their competitors, 
counter-parties and opponents will find it possible to access data stored in the 
cloud – despite justifiable claims of privilege or confidentiality – merely because 
these data have been placed in the hands of third parties who may consent, 
perhaps limited by contracts and perhaps not, to divulge the data stored with 
them. 
VII. SOME LUDDITE-LEANING CONCLUSIONS 
Recent events including the NSA data-mining programs, including the DC 
law firm-Government of Indonesia incident described above, and the late 2013 
Target and Neiman Marcus data security breaches compel the conclusion that 
lawyers and law firms should rethink their uses of cloud computing generally, as 
well as the manner in which they protect all files, documents, and 
communications with clients, and to select means to store the most sensitive data 
and all privileged data somewhere that still enjoys more protection from 
government access and surveillance than data stored in the cloud.  This is true, 
even as described above, the privilege can only be waived by the client – and not 
by government interception – for the purposes of criminal prosecutions. 
These events strongly suggest that, for the most sensitive files and data, 
lawyers and law firms should revert to old-fashioned methods to protect client 
communications and safeguard clients’ property, including confidential and other 
files.  Such old-fashioned methods include using manual typewriters,124 attending 
meetings in person as opposed to via teleconferences, Skype or telephone calls, 
and locking paper and electronic records in file cabinets in lawyers’ offices and 
storing sensitive archives in actual warehouses (where the thief would need a 
good map or lots of time to find the high-value records they can access 
electronically otherwise).  These physical and administrative security measures – 
in addition to appropriate technical security measures – will allow lawyers and 
law firms to control access to sensitive information in more effective, if less 
technology dependent ways.  It also means that in the trio of possible means of 
securing data – physical, administrative and technical safeguards – that physical 
and administrative safeguards are no less important, and possibly more important 
and easy to enforce than the technical safeguards on which we have placed so 
much emphasis recently. 
Enhanced security for communications with clients and for data stored also 
means renewing restrictions on the use of smart phones and tablets, laptops and 
off-site desktops, flash drives and other peripherals.  These restrictions for 
confidential and privileged data and communications also include not using 
                                                                                                                                   
 124. See Kremlin Security Agency to buy typewriters “to avoid leaks”, BBC (Jul. 11, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23282308 (explaining that the Kremlin Security 
Agency’s decision to use typewriters is attributed to Edward Snowden’s leaks of NSA policies and 
data and the unique “handwriting” that enables documents to be associated with each machine). 
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voicemail or similar systems that involve telecomm that the NSA, other 
governments or the client’s competitors might be able to obtain.  Does it make 
me sound like a Luddite?  I imagine that it will to many readers – particularly 
proponents of the technology-solves-all approaches to efficiency and productivity 
issues. 
Revelations about data mining by the NSA and the U.K.’s spy agencies also 
necessitates more robust conversations with clients about the sensitivity of their 
files and records and of their communications with lawyers.  This means staying 
abreast of developments and sharing findings with clients, and involving them in 
the cost-benefit analyses of how and where to store files and records, and how to 
conduct necessary communications.  The 2012 additions to MRPC Rule 1.6(c)’s 
comments also require consideration of steps the lawyer needs to be conscious of 
and prepared for in terms of compliance with state or federal data security breach 
laws so that they can obtain informed consent from their clients.125 
There is no question that the NSA’s metadata-collection program, as well as 
the published reports that the NSA can reach certain content elements as well as 
metadata in messages,126 will make it much harder for lawyers and law firms to 
protect the confidentiality and privilege of their client’s communications with 
them and other sensitive data from the government.  Commentators have 
predicted that the “back doors” that the NSA has introduced also threaten to 
facilitate unauthorized access by hackers, and possibly by competitors.127 
The NSA surveillance of telecomm and its introduction of radio-frequency-
enabled “back doors” to many computing and telecomm devices chips away at 
the reasonable expectation of privacy in communications and document 
exchanges between lawyers and their clients that have provided the framework 
for access by government agencies to tangible records in the hands of third 
parties and for other purposes in “search and seizure” jurisprudence since United 
States v. Katz128 and United States v. Miller.129  In connection with MRPC Rule 
1.6,130 this recent knowledge alters otherwise applicable protections for 
documents, files and communications under domestic law and, at least equally 
                                                                                                                                   
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
 126. See James Ball, Angry Birds and ‘leaky’ phone apps targeted by NSA and GCHQ for user 
data, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-
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 127. See, e.g., Jason Mick, Tax and Spy: How the NSA Can Hack Any American, Stores 
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important, it alters or jettisons terms of otherwise applicable confidentiality 
agreements – among the factors cited in Comment 17 to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s normal precautions.131  After all, 
as one commentator observed:  “Because … [cybersecurity] standards [such as 
ISO 27001] are not compulsory … your protection in court against legal redress 
always boils down to due diligence.”132 
To make that point even more relevant to lawyers and law firms, just as I was 
completing the draft of this paper for this symposium, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (“NIST”) issued its newest standards, the Framework 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.133  The Executive Summary 
summarizes reasons why diligent management of cybersecurity risk is important:  
“Similar to financial and reputational risk, cybersecurity risk affects a company’s 
bottom line.  It can drive up costs and impact revenue.  It can harm an 
organization’s ability to innovate and to gain and maintain customers.”134 
So, after looking at the issues raised by lawyers’ professional responsibilities 
in the post-Snowden era, my mind keeps spinning through Joni Mitchell’s 
famous, pre-Internet and pre-cell phone – and definitely pre-cloud computing and 
storage -- refrain:   
I’ve looked at clouds from both sides now, 
From up and down, and still somehow 
it’s cloud illusions I recall, 
I really don’t know clouds at all.135 
Responsible steps that lawyers and law firms can take include all of the 
individual cyber-smart steps mentioning in Part VI of this paper and the 
additional steps mentioned by Nelson & Simek.136  They also include old-
fashioned, low-tech physical and administrative steps such as mentioned 
above.137  And some of these low-tech steps are as old-fashioned as meeting in 
person to discuss ultra-sensitive issues, using manual typewriters, and locked 
filing cabinets or vaults to store clients’ trade secrets, medical information, non-
public personally identifiable information, and negotiations over mergers and 
acquisitions or the like.  Some of the responsible storage and communications of 
clients’ records and data security practices really might not include clouds at all 
– even if it makes me unpopular with cloud computing vendors. 
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